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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
JOHN CUNNINGHAM and DENNIS PARKER,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.
12253

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction and sentence of
an unlawful sale of an hallucinogenic drug in the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellants were tried on a charge of the unlawful
sale of LSD, contrary to Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-6(a)
(1953), before the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, sitting
without a jury. Upon a verdict of guilty appellants were
sentenced on July 20, 1970, to a term of imprisonment
at the Utah State Prison; and are appealing from the
judgment and sentence.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent prays that the findings of the lower
court be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In late November of 1969, agent Loni DeLand, doing
undercover work for the Utah Liquor Law Enforcement
Division, and Kathy Olson, his assistant, made the acquaintance of one Mike Fellows. They bought some LSD
tablets from Fellows and had requested more, hoping
that Fellows could lead them to the source of his supply.
Fellows, on November 30, 1969, took DeLand and Olson
to the appellants' apartment located at 329 East Seventh
South, Salt Lake City. There DeLand and Olson met
appellant Parker (R. 29-31).
While DeLand and another police officer stayed
downstairs, Olson, Fellows and Parker went upstairs.
Kathy Olson was introduced to Cunningham by Fellows.
Olson then inquired as to whether or not she could get a
quantity of LSD tablets from appellants. Cunningham
told her that the price for the tablets would be $2.50 per
tablet or "hit." Cunningham stated that he had some
LSD tablets but that if Olson would wait until the 3rd
of December he could then tell her how much he could
supply. She gave Cunningham her telephone number and
he said that he would call on December 3rd (R. 61-62).
DeLand and Olson went to the appellants' apartment
on the 3rd of December, 1969. They were invited in by
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Parker, went upstairs, and were seated in the living room.
A few minutes later Cunningham entered the room.
Cunningham then asked Olson and DeLand if they still
planned to buy a large quantity of LSD on the 5th of
December. They replied that they did but stated that
they only wanted eight tablets or "hits" at that time.
Miss Olson aslrnd Cunningham the price and he replied
"$2.50 per hit." Appellant Parker then removed eight
orange tablets from a small glass vial containing 20 to 25
orange tablets and gave them to DeLand. DeLand then
gave the two a $20 bill (R. 31-35).
Cunningham and Parker were subsequently arrested
on December 5, 1969, and charged with an unlawful sale
of hallucinogenic drugs (R. 95-96) .
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
APPELLANTS' DE FENS E OF ENTRAPMENT IS NOT SUFFICIENT LEGALLY OR
FACTUALLY TO REVERSE THEIR CONVICTIONS.
The first Supreme Court decision to deal with the
defense of entrapment was Sorrells v. United States, 287
U. S. 435, 53 S. Ct. 210, 77 L. Ed. 413 (1932). The case
concerned a federal agent who asked the defendant to
procure some liquor for him. After several requests by
the agent and after the agent told the defendant that he
was in the same army unit as the defendant the agent
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received the liquor. As the court stated at 287 U. S. at
441:

"It is clear that the evidence was sufficient
to warrant a finding that the act for which defendant was prosecuted was instigated by the prohibition agent, that it was the creature of his purpose, that defendant had no previous disposition
to commit it but was an industrious law-abiding
citizen, and that the agent lured defendant, otherwise innocent, to its commission by repeated and
persistent solicitation in which he succeeded by
taking advantage of the sentiment aroused by
reminiscences of their experiences as companions
in arms in the World War."
The court went on to hold that the defense of entrapment should have been available to defendant at
trial. In so holding the court also provided a rule by
which to gauge evidence of entrapment. At page 451, 216,
the court said:
"The predisposition and criminal design of the
defendant are relevant. But the issues raised must
be pertinent to the controlling question whether
the defendant is a person otherwise innocent
whom the government is seeking to punish for an
alleged offense which is the product of the creative
activity of its own officials."
In Utah the standard for entrapment is set out in
the opinion of State v. Pacheco, 13 Utah 2d 148, 369 P.
2d 494 (1962). As stated by Justice Crockett:
"For a peace officer to procure a person to
commit a crime which he otherwise would not
have committed,' for the purpose of apprehending
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prosecuting him is entrapment. This is so
discordant to the true function of law enforcement
which is the prevention, not the accusation of
cr~e; .and so repugnant to fundamental conc~pts
of Justice that the conviction of an accused under
such circumstances will not be approved. When
that issue is present the question is whether the
crime is the product of defendant's own intention
and desire, or is the product of some incitement
or inducement by the peace officer. If the crime
was in fact so instigated or induced by what the
officer did that the latter's conduct was the generating cause which produced the crime, and without which it would not have been committed, the
defendant should not be convicted. On the other
hand if defendant's attitude of mind was such
that he desired and intended to commit the crime,
the mere fact that an officer or someone else
afforded him the opportunity to commit it would
not constitute entrapment which would be a defense to its commission; and this would not be
less true even though an undercover man went
along with the defendant in the criminal plan and
aided or encouraged him in it."

~d

Respondent contends that neither under the holding
of Sorrells or Pacheco can appellants show that they were
entrapped. Their arrest and subsequent conviction was
because they desired and intended to commit the crime.
The state agents involved in the case only afforded defendants an opportunity to commit the crime.
The defense of entrapment has been held to be a
defense as a matter of law in some instances. In the case
of Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S. Ct. 819,
2 L. Ed. 2d 848 (1958), the court held that the evidence

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

showed entrapment as a matter of law. The defendant
there was a narcotics addict who was being medically
treated for his addiction. The defendant happened to
make the acquaintance of another addict also being
treated by the same doctor. The other addict was also
a government informer. They requested Sherman to supply him with drugs, a request which Sherman declined.
Sherman finally relented after several requests and several appeals to his sympathies by the government informer. Thereafter he supplied the informer with drugs
on ~everal occasions. The informer's solicitation not only
enticed Sherman into selling drugs but also got him to
return to his old drug habit. The Court felt that the informer's actions were so blatantly contrary to public policy and so obviously evil that the Court found entrapment as a matter of law.
The facts in the case at hand do not point to entrapment per se. At the first meeting on November 29,
1969, Kathy Olson inquired as to how much LSD they
could get. She was told by Cunningham that he would
know on the 3rd of December, 1969, how much he could
supply to her and that he had some LSD tablets then
but they were promised to someone else (R. 61-62). At
the second meeting of the appellants and DeLand and
Olson, Cunningham asked if they still wanted a large
quantity of LSD. Olson and DeLand replied that they
did but at that time they only wanted eight tablets of
LSD, with which they were supplied (R. 31-35). The
evidence does not show entrapment as a matter of law
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as in Sherman. The evidence does show a request made
by Olson and DeLand that was readily complied with
by appellants.
The appellants raised the defense of entrapment at
the trial court. Once the defendants bring into issue the
defense of entrapment the state's evidence must be sufficient to rebut it. In the Utah case of State v. Perkins,
19 Utah 2d 421, 432 P. 2d 50 (1967), the defense attorney
brought into issue entrapment. In order to overcome that
defense the state showed evidence of prior contacts between the state's agent and the defendant. The evidence
showed prior solicitations and drug sales by the defendant. This evidence was used in order to show an intent
or a predisposition to commit the criminal act. Such evidence shows that a defendant is not an innocent, lawabiding citizen who was coaxed by government agents to
do a criminal act, but was in reality a person who was
ready and willing to commit a criminal act. In the case
of State v. Kasai, 27 Utah 2d 236, 495 P. 2d 1265 (1972),
the prosecution again used evidence of prior drug sales
to show that the defendant had a prior inclination to
commit the crime of selling marijuana.
In the instant case there is no evidence of prior drug
sales, prior convictions for drug sales, or prior contacts
with state agents. The exact issue that is present here
has not been raised in the courts of Utah. The issue is
:oimply one of showing intent or predisposition to commit
aa criminal act absent any prior evidence of criminal activity. That issue was also presented in United States v.
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Rodrigues, 433 F. 2d 760 (1st Cir. 1970). There the defendant was convicted of selling heroin to a government
agent. The defendant pled entrapment as a defense to
the charge. The court's approach to the problem of entrapment was not the traditional bifurcation of the defense into the sub-issues of inducement and predisposition. They used an analysis developed in an earlier case,
Kadis v. United States, 373 F. 2d 370 (1st Cir. 1967).
With that approach the court examines " 'ultimate questions of entrapment.' " The defendant first goes forward
with the defense by showing some evidence that it was
not his intent or predisposition to commit the crime
charged. The government must then prove defendant
was not induced to commit the criminal act by its agents.
In Rodrigues, there was no evidence of prior connection
with the narcotics trade to rebut the entrapment defense.
The court, however, held that there were other means
to rebut this defense. The court states at page 762 of the
oprmon:
"A jury can find predisposition beyond a
reasonable doubt by looking to the totality of
circumstances involved in the particular transactions in question. Otherwise, a first offender, disposed to commit the crime for which he is charged,
would find sanctuary in the entrapment defense
merely because the government would be unable
to prove prior nonexistent activities. The entrapment defense does not require such a result."
By examining the totality of conduct of the appellants it is clear that their entrapment defense breaks
down. The appellants had other quantities of LSD tab-
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lets promised to other buyers. The state agents involved
made oaly two contacts with the appellants. From the
testimony given, the appellants were unwary and readily
sold the illicit drugs to the agents after only two short
encounters. Cunningham and Parker claim they were
afraid of the agents and that is why they sold them the
LSD (R. 84 and 98). A girl who was at the apartment
on December 3, 1969, Sally Neilson, testified that although the agents were strangers they did not make
threats or use any threatening language while there (R.
94) . If appellants were truly fearful they could have
asked the agents to leave or put their requests off until
a later date. However, they did not do this, they readily
sold the agents the LSD tablets and readily accepted the
$20 as payment (R. 34-35, 84).
Appellants' testimony that they were afraid of the
agents is unworthy of belief. There is absolutely no affirmative evidence that the state agents did anything to
ma!rn appellants fearful.
In conclusion it is respondent's contention that the
entrapment defense was rebutted by the state's evidence.
Appellants readily sold the LSD tablets to the two state
agents. Thus, the test of Pacheco, to show an intention
or predisposition to commit criminal acts is satisfied Respondents urge the court to adopt the position of the
court in the Rodrigues case. By looking at the totality
of conduct and the ready compliance with the requests
for the illicit drug, it is clear that the appellants were not
innocent citizens entrapped by the state, but were crim-
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inals engaging in the proscribed act of selling drugs, not
only to the two state agents, but others. Appellants cannot hid behind the entrapment defense merely because
there is no evidence of prior drug sales. The conviction
should be affirmed.
POINT II.
APPELLANTS WERE PROPERLY C 0 N VI CT ED AND SENTENCED FOR THE
CRIME OF SALE OF AN HALLUCINOGENIC DRUG.
Appellants claim that they were convicted and sentenced under one statute, Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-6 (1),
that made the crime of sale of LSD a felony, while there
was a similar statute, Utah Code Ann. §58-17-14.11, that
makes the same conduct a misdemeanor. It is true that
both of these statutes do exist, or did at the time appellants were convicted; however, the two statutes have
totally different applications. Utah Code Ann. § 58-1714.11 is a statute that applies to the regulations of pharmacists and the pharmacy profession. Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-33-6 (1) is a statute designed to curb the abuse and
distribution of dangerous drugs and narcotics. The real
question that is raised by appellants' argument is showing the application and construction of the two statutes
involved. It is respondent's contention that by a logical
reading of the statutes involved it is readily apparent
that appellants were properly convicted and sentenced
for violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-6 (1).
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Appellants were charged with a violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-33-6 (1). That statute states:

"It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, compound, process, possess have under
his control, sell, prescribe, administer, dispense,
use or compound any depressant, stimulant, or
hallucinogenic, or other drug, as defined herein,
except this prohibition shall not apply to the following persons whose activities in connection with
any such drug are as specified in this subsection.

"

The act then exempts manufacturers operating in
conformance with state laws, pharmacies, physicians, laboratories, wholesale druggists, hospitals, and generally all
those people who are licensed by the state and who are
engaged in the legitimate sale, manufacture, prescribing
and use of drugs. The penalty for violation of the abovequoted statute is found in Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-4 (3),
which states:
"Every person who transports, imports into
this state, sell, furnish, administer, or give away,
or attempts to import into this state or transport
any 'depressant, stimulant or hallucinogenic drug,'
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison from five years to life and shall not be
eligible for release upon completion of sentence
or on parole or on any other basis until he has
served not less than three years."
The statute regulating the profession of pharmacy
and of pharmacists, Utah Code Ann. § 58-17-14.11 reads
as follows:
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"Any proprietor of a pharmacy or other person who shall sell, dispose of, or permit the sale or
other di~position of any drug intended for use by
man which under the laws of this state or the laws
of the United States, or lawful regulations thereunder, has been designated habit forming, unsafe
for use except under the supervision of a practitioner licensed to administer such drugs, or otherwise limited to use under professional supervision
of a practitioner licensed by law to prescribe, unless it is dispensed upon a prescription of a practitioner licensed by law to administer the same,
shall be guilty of an offense."
Utah Code Ann. § 58-17-26 provides that for violation
of the above-quoted statute a person shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor.
Appellants cite two cases attempting to uphold their
argument that the lesser penalty should apply. The first
case cited is State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P. 2d
146 (1969). There the defendant was charged and convicted of possession of LSD, a misdemeanor under Utah
Code Ann. § 58-33-4 ( 1) , but a felony under Utah Code
Ann. § 58-13a-44. The court held that since the prohibited
conduct under both statutes was the same the lesser penalty provided in Section 58-33-4 (1) would apply. Shondel
can be distinguished from the instant case in that in
Shondel, two different laws violating illicit drug sales did
apply. Here one statute deals with illicit drug sales and
another deals with unlawful sales over the counter at
pharmacies or by pharmacists.
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Appellant cites State v. Fair, 23 Utah 2d 34, 456 P.
2d 168 ( 1969) , for the proposition that when two different statutes apply the one providing the lesser penalty
should govern. In Fair, the defendant was charged with
uttering a forged prescription, a felony under Utah Code
Ann. § 58-13a-39 but only a misdemeanor under Utah
Code Ann. § 58-17-14.13. The court rightly held that the
misdemeanor penalty should apply. Uttering a forged
prescription should properly be considered under a statu te relating to regulation of pharmacies and pharmacists.
Fair can be distinguished from the instant case in that
in Fair there was a true conflict between statutes prescribing differing penalties for the same conduct. In the
instant case the two statutes relate to differing conduct.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-17-14.11 deals with dispensing of
drugs or medicines by pharmacists or those in the pharmacy business. Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-6 (1) deals with
the illegal dispensing of dangerous drugs by those other
than licensed pharmacists or qualified medical people.
The real problem here, as stated previously, is interpreting and applying the two statutes in question in
a consistent logical manner. A guide to statutory interpretation is provided for us in the case of Johnson v.
State Tax Commission, 17 Utah 2d 337, 411 P. 2d 831
(1966). In that case the issue was the interpretation and
implication of state tax laws. The court states:
"The fundamental consideration which transcends all others in regard to the interpretation
and application of a statute is: What was the
intent of the legislature? All other rules of statu-
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tory construction are subordinate to it and are
helpful ?nl~ insofar as they assist in attaining
that objective. In determining that intent the
statute should be considered in the light of the
purpose it was designed to serve and so applied
as to carry out that purpose if that can be done
consistent with its language."
The same proposition, that is carrying out the intent
of the legislature, is cited in Young v. Barney, 20 Utah
2d 108, 433 P. 2d 846 (1967), and in State v. Salt Lake
City Public Board of Education, 13 Utah 2d 56, 368 P.
2d 468 (1962).
Appellants' application of Utah Code Ann. § 58-1714.11 is \Vithout merit. The statute applies only to "any
proprietor of a pharmacy or other person." The well established rule of statutory construction, ejusdem generis,
requires that where general words or terms follow specific
ones, the general must be understood as applying to
things of the same kind as specified. W. S. Hatch Co. v.
Public Service Commission, 3 Utah 2d 7, 277 P. 2d 809
(1954). Therefore, an "other person' must be interpreted
as someone associated with a pharmacy as an agent, employee, owner, etc. acting in connection with the pharmacy. Furthermore, the general common-sense rule of
statutory construction stated in Johnson v. State Tax
Commission, supra, supports this rule. In applying that
rule it is clear that § 58-17-14.11 was designed to deal only
with pharmacies and pharmacists. Section 58-33-6 exempts pharmacists and others licensed to prescribe drugs
from its provisions. Section 58-17-14.11 applies only to
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pharrne.cies and the pharmacy profession because of their
cxpE:::it exemption in Section 58-17-14.11. The intent of
the legislature was to regulate two areas. One, they
vvished to regulate the pharmacy profession. Two, they
w:,:lied to regulate illegal drug traffic. The two statutes
were designed to regulate two types of conduct by two
different classes of people. This is consistent with the
holding in Fair where a forged prescription was crime
under the pharmacy statute, a statute logically designed
to deal with such things.

a

Appellants made much of the language of § 58-1714.11 that the statute is intended to cover drugs "intended for use by man." The point of the statute is not
that it regulates drugs intended for man's use but that
it regulates drugs that are dispensed by pharmacists.
Heroin too is a drug that is used by man. However, it
has no real medical use nor is it dispensed by phannacistso Likewise LSD has very limited, if any, medical use
and is not dispensed by pharmacies. Therefore, the
prnper statute for regulating traffic in illicit drugs such
as LSD is Section 58-33-6 (1).
Under Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-4 (3) the proper sentence for selling LSD is five years to life in the state
prison. Appellants contend that Utah Code Ann. § 5833-4(6), which makes violation of all other provisions of
Chapter 33, except those in Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-1 (1)
- 58-33-1 ( 4) a felony punishable by a maximum five
year sentence, applies in this case. Their argument is
that since they were charged with a violation of Section
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58-33-6 ( 1) and this is an "other" provision of Chapter 33
then the sentence should be no more than five years. This
argument lacks substance. Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-6 (1)
proscribes the selling or furnishing of a hallucinogen.
Therefore, since Section 58-33-1 (3) is one of the four
paragraphs mentioned by Section 58-33-4 ( 6) , Section 5833-4 (6) does not apply.

CONCLUSION
Appellants were convicted under a valid Utah statute. The sentence imposed was a proper one in the case,
a sentence of from five years to life for the sale of LSD.
Appellants readily sold the illegal drug to two state
agents when it was requested by them. The conviction
and sentence is proper and should be upheld.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
WILLIAM T. EVANS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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